

# Coherence-Rupture-Regeneration and Solomonoff Induction: A Mathematical Comparison

Mathematical Analysis

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## Abstract

This document presents a mathematical analysis comparing the Coherence-Rupture-Regeneration (CRR) framework with Solomonoff induction. We establish correspondence theorems between the two frameworks and identify what each provides. The main findings are: (1) CRR surprisal corresponds to accumulated conditional Kolmogorov complexity; (2) CRR rupture implements MDL model switching; (3) CRR regeneration implements a soft MDL evidence-weighting mechanism related to, but distinct from, Solomonoff's universal prior; (4) the frameworks are compatible, with CRR providing operational details that Solomonoff leaves unspecified. We carefully distinguish the pairwise switching threshold from the global temperature parameter.

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Scope

This document compares two frameworks for inductive inference:

- (i) **Solomonoff Induction** (1964): A theoretical framework for sequence prediction based on algorithmic information theory and Kolmogorov complexity. It provides optimality guarantees but is incomputable.
- (ii) **Coherence-Rupture-Regeneration (CRR)**: A framework describing how bounded systems maintain identity through discontinuous change, grounded in Bayesian model comparison.

We address three questions:

1. What is the mathematical relationship between CRR and Solomonoff induction?
2. Are the two frameworks compatible?
3. What does each framework provide that the other does not?

## 1.2 Summary of Findings

### Main Findings

#### What Solomonoff Induction Provides:

- The optimal prior over hypotheses:  $P(h) = 2^{-K(h)}$
- The optimal posterior:  $P(h|y) \propto P(y|h) \cdot 2^{-K(h)}$
- Proof of optimality (dominates all computable predictors)

#### What Solomonoff Does Not Provide:

- When to act on accumulated evidence
- A computable implementation
- The mechanism of model change
- Tunable parameters for different contexts

#### What CRR Adds:

- Decision rule: switch when  $\mathcal{S}_m - \mathcal{S}_{m'} > \Delta_{m,m'}$
- Computable approximation via temporal surprisal accumulation
- Regeneration operator with temperature parameter  $\Omega$
- Separation of switching threshold  $\Delta$  from selection sharpness  $\Omega$

### 1.3 The Three-Framework Synthesis

Framework	Specifies	Mathematical Form
Solomonoff	What is optimal	$P(h) = 2^{-K(h)}$
Free Energy Principle	What to minimize	$F = \mathbb{E}[\log q] - \mathbb{E}[\log p]$
CRR	When and how	$\mathcal{S} \rightarrow \delta \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ with threshold $\Delta$ , temperature $\Omega$

## 2 Preliminaries

### 2.1 Algorithmic Information Theory

**Definition 2.1** (Kolmogorov Complexity). The *Kolmogorov complexity* of a string  $x$  with respect to universal machine  $U$  is:

$$K_U(x) = \min\{|p| : U(p) = x\} \quad (1)$$

where  $|p|$  denotes the length of program  $p$  in bits.

**Definition 2.2** (Conditional Kolmogorov Complexity). The complexity of  $x$  given  $y$  is:

$$K(x|y) = \min\{|p| : U(p, y) = x\} \quad (2)$$

**Theorem 2.3** (Invariance Theorem). For any two universal machines  $U_1, U_2$ , there exists a constant  $c$  such that for all  $x$ :

$$|K_{U_1}(x) - K_{U_2}(x)| \leq c \quad (3)$$

### 2.2 Solomonoff Induction

**Definition 2.4** (Solomonoff Prior). The *Solomonoff prior* over hypotheses (programs) is:

$$P_{\text{Sol}}(h) = 2^{-K(h)} \quad (4)$$

This assigns higher probability to simpler hypotheses.

**Definition 2.5** (Solomonoff Posterior). Given data  $y$ , the posterior over hypotheses is:

$$P_{\text{Sol}}(h|y) \propto P(y|h) \cdot 2^{-K(h)} = 2^{-K(y|h)} \cdot 2^{-K(h)} \approx 2^{-K(h,y)} \quad (5)$$

where the approximation uses the chain rule  $K(h, y) = K(h) + K(y|h) + O(\log n)$ .

**Theorem 2.6** (Solomonoff Convergence). Let  $\mu$  be any computable measure. The expected total squared prediction error is bounded:

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mu} \left[ \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} (P_{\text{Sol}}(x_{n+1}|x_{1:n}) - \mu(x_{n+1}|x_{1:n}))^2 \right] \leq K(\mu) \ln 2 \quad (6)$$

**Remark 2.7** (Incomputability). Solomonoff induction is incomputable because computing  $K(x)$  requires solving the halting problem.

### 2.3 CRR Framework

**Definition 2.8** (CRR System). A *CRR system* is a tuple  $(\mathcal{M}, Y, \Pi, \Delta, \Omega, \mathcal{S}, R)$  where:

- $\mathcal{M} = \{m, m', \dots\}$  is a set of generative models
- $Y = \mathbb{R}^d$  is the observation space
- $\Pi : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \text{PD}(d)$  assigns precision matrices
- $\Delta : \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is the **switching threshold** (pairwise, model-dependent)
- $\Omega > 0$  is the **temperature/rigidity parameter** (global)
- $\mathcal{S} : \mathcal{M} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$  is the surprisal accumulator
- $R$  is the regeneration operator

**Remark 2.9** (Two Distinct Parameters). We explicitly separate:

- $\Delta_{m,m'}$ : The threshold for switching from model  $m$  to  $m'$ , related to description-length overhead and prior odds
- $\Omega$ : A temperature-like parameter controlling how sharply regeneration weights historical states

These serve different functions and should not be conflated.

**Definition 2.10** (Dual Variables: Surprisal and Evidence). We define two dual quantities that are negatives of each other:

**Surprisal / Incoherence / Cost:**

$$\mathcal{S}_m(n) := \sum_{i=1}^n -\log p(y_i | y_{<i}, m) \approx \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - g_m(\mu_i))^\top \Pi_m (y_i - g_m(\mu_i)) + \text{const} \quad (7)$$

This is a *cost*: higher values indicate worse model fit (more surprise).

**Evidence / Coherence / Support:**

$$\mathcal{E}_m(n) := -\mathcal{S}_m(n) = \sum_{i=1}^n \log p(y_i | y_{<i}, m) \quad (8)$$

This is a *credit*: higher values indicate better model fit (more support).

These are simply negatives of each other:  $\mathcal{E} = -\mathcal{S}$ .

**Definition 2.11** (CRR Operators). The three CRR operators, written in both conventions:

**Rupture Condition** (equivalent forms):

$$\text{Switch } m \rightarrow m' \quad \text{when } \mathcal{S}_m(n) - \mathcal{S}_{m'}(n) > \Delta_{m,m'} \quad (9)$$

or equivalently:

$$\mathcal{E}_{m'}(n) - \mathcal{E}_m(n) > \Delta_{m,m'} \quad (10)$$

(switch when the alternative has sufficiently more evidence)

**Regeneration** (equivalent forms):

$$R[\phi](t) = \frac{1}{Z} \int_0^t \phi(\tau) \cdot \exp\left(\frac{\mathcal{E}(\tau)}{\Omega}\right) \cdot \Theta(t - \tau) d\tau \quad (11)$$

or equivalently:

$$R[\phi](t) = \frac{1}{Z} \int_0^t \phi(\tau) \cdot \exp\left(-\frac{\mathcal{S}(\tau)}{\Omega}\right) \cdot \Theta(t - \tau) d\tau \quad (12)$$

States with more evidence (less surprisal) receive higher weight.

**Remark 2.12** (Why Dual Variables?). Both forms are mathematically identical but serve different intuitions:

- **Surprisal view** ( $\mathcal{S}$ ): Accumulated prediction error / strain / cost. Rupture occurs when cost exceeds threshold. Regeneration penalizes high cost:  $\exp(-\mathcal{S}/\Omega)$ .
- **Evidence view** ( $\mathcal{E}$ ): Accumulated log-likelihood / support / credit. Rupture occurs when alternative has more support. Regeneration rewards high evidence:  $\exp(\mathcal{E}/\Omega)$ .

The Solomonoff correspondence is cleaner in the evidence view:

$$w(m) \propto p(y|m) = \exp(\mathcal{E}_m) \propto \exp(\mathcal{E}_m/\Omega) \quad \text{when } \Omega = 1 \quad (13)$$

### 3 Correspondence Theorems

#### 3.1 Surprisal and Kolmogorov Complexity

**Theorem 3.1** (Surprisal-Complexity Correspondence). *Let  $y_{1:n}$  be an observation sequence and  $m$  a computable generative model. Define the algorithmic surprisal:*

$$\mathcal{S}_m^{\text{alg}}(n) = \sum_{i=1}^n K(y_i|y_{<i}, m) \quad (14)$$

Then for CRR surprisal under Gaussian observations:

$$\mathcal{S}_m(n) = \mathcal{S}_m^{\text{alg}}(n) + O(n) \quad (15)$$

where the  $O(n)$  term accounts for encoding overhead.

*Proof. Step 1:* By Levin's coding theorem, for any computable distribution  $P$ :

$$-\log P(x) = K(x) + O(K(P)) \quad (16)$$

**Step 2:** CRR surprisal under Gaussian observations equals negative log-likelihood:

$$\mathcal{S}_m(n) = -\log p(y_{1:n}|m) + \frac{n}{2} \log \det(2\pi\Sigma_m) \quad (17)$$

**Step 3:** Combining:

$$\mathcal{S}_m(n) = \sum_{i=1}^n [-\log p(y_i|y_{<i}, m)] + O(n) \quad (18)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n [K(y_i|y_{<i}, m) + O(1)] + O(n) = \mathcal{S}_m^{\text{alg}}(n) + O(n) \quad (19)$$

□

**Remark 3.2** (Temporal Survival as Complexity Proxy). Models with low surprisal accumulation over time *behave as if* they have low Kolmogorov complexity, without computing  $K$  directly. This provides a computable proxy for the incomputable complexity measure.

### 3.2 Rupture and Minimum Description Length

**Theorem 3.3** (Rupture as MDL Model Switching). *The CRR rupture condition implements MDL model switching. Specifically, the switching threshold corresponds to:*

$$\Delta_{m,m'} = K(m') - K(m) + K(\text{switch}) \quad (20)$$

which is the description-length overhead for adopting model  $m'$  over  $m$ .

*Proof.* The MDL principle selects the model minimizing total description length:

$$m^* = \arg \min_m [K(m) + K(y_{1:n}|m)] \quad (21)$$

Model  $m'$  is preferred over  $m$  when:

$$K(m') + K(y_{1:n}|m') < K(m) + K(y_{1:n}|m) \quad (22)$$

Rearranging:

$$K(y_{1:n}|m) - K(y_{1:n}|m') > K(m') - K(m) \quad (23)$$

Substituting CRR variables via Theorem 3.1:

$$\mathcal{S}_m(n) - \mathcal{S}_{m'}(n) > \underbrace{K(m') - K(m)}_{\Delta_{m,m'}} \quad (24)$$

□

**Remark 3.4** (Threshold is Model-Dependent). The switching threshold  $\Delta_{m,m'}$  depends on the complexity difference between models. This is *not* the same as the temperature parameter  $\Omega$ .

### 3.3 Regeneration and Evidence Weighting

**Theorem 3.5** (Regeneration as MDL Evidence Weighting). *CRR regeneration implements a soft MDL evidence-weighting mechanism. For a hypothesis  $h$  evaluated on data  $y$ :*

$$w(h; y) \propto \exp\left(-\frac{\mathcal{S}_h(y)}{\Omega}\right) \approx \exp\left(-\frac{K(y|h)}{\Omega \ln 2}\right) = 2^{-K(y|h)/\Omega'} \quad (25)$$

where  $\Omega' = \Omega \ln 2$ .

*This weights hypotheses by how well they compress the data (the **likelihood/evidence term**), not by the prior complexity of the hypothesis itself.*

*Proof.* From Definition 2.11, regeneration weights by  $\exp(-\mathcal{S}/\Omega)$ .

By Theorem 3.1:

$$\mathcal{S}_h(y) \approx K(y|h) + O(n) \quad (26)$$

Therefore:

$$w(h; y) \propto \exp\left(-\frac{K(y|h) + O(n)}{\Omega}\right) \propto 2^{-K(y|h)/(\Omega \ln 2)} \quad (27)$$

□

**Remark 3.6** (Distinction from Solomonoff Prior). This is **not** the Solomonoff prior  $2^{-K(h)}$  over hypotheses. The correspondence is:

Solomonoff	CRR Regeneration
Prior: $P(h) \propto 2^{-K(h)}$	Not directly represented
Likelihood: $P(y h) \propto 2^{-K(y h)}$	$w(h; y) \propto \exp(-\mathcal{S}_h(y)/\Omega)$
Posterior: $P(h y) \propto 2^{-K(h,y)}$	Would require adding prior term

CRR regeneration captures the **evidence/likelihood** component of Bayesian inference, weighting hypotheses by how well they explain the data. To recover the full Solomonoff posterior, one would need to additionally weight by a prior term proportional to  $2^{-K(h)}$  or equivalently  $\exp(-K(h)/\Omega')$ .

**Corollary 3.7** (Full Posterior Recovery). *To recover Solomonoff-like posterior weighting, CRR would need:*

$$w_{full}(h; y) \propto \underbrace{\exp\left(-\frac{K(h)}{\Omega'}\right)}_{\text{prior term}} \cdot \underbrace{\exp\left(-\frac{K(y|h)}{\Omega'}\right)}_{\text{CRR regeneration}} = \exp\left(-\frac{K(h, y)}{\Omega'}\right) \quad (28)$$

where the prior term could be implemented via the model prior  $p(m)$  in the CRR system.

### 3.4 Parameter Identification

**Proposition 3.8** (Temperature-Complexity Scaling). *For CRR regeneration weights to match Solomonoff likelihood weighting exactly:*

$$\exp\left(-\frac{\mathcal{S}}{\Omega}\right) = 2^{-K(y|h)} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \Omega = \frac{1}{\ln 2} \approx 1.443 \text{ (in nats)} \quad (29)$$

**Remark 3.9** (The  $\Omega = 1/\pi$  Conjecture). CRR documentation conjectures a universal value  $\Omega = 1/\pi \approx 0.318$ . This is **not** the same as the Solomonoff-matching value  $1/\ln 2 \approx 1.443$ .

If  $\Omega = 1/\pi$ , then:

$$w(h; y) \propto 2^{-K(y|h) \cdot \pi / \ln 2} \approx 2^{-4.53 \cdot K(y|h)} \quad (30)$$

This represents *more aggressive* complexity penalization than standard Solomonoff weighting—a “colder” selection temperature.

Whether  $\Omega = 1/\pi$  has deeper significance remains an open question, but it is mathematically distinct from Solomonoff correspondence.

## 4 What Each Framework Provides

### 4.1 What Solomonoff Provides

1. **Optimal prior:**  $P(h) = 2^{-K(h)}$  over hypotheses (programs)
2. **Optimal posterior:**  $P(h|y) \propto 2^{-K(h)} \cdot 2^{-K(y|h)}$
3. **Convergence guarantee:** Total prediction error bounded by  $K(\mu) \ln 2$

### 4.2 What Solomonoff Does Not Provide

1. **When to act:** No decision rule for committing to a model
2. **Computability:**  $K(h)$  is uncomputable
3. **Model change mechanism:** How one model replaces another
4. **Parameter flexibility:** Prior is fixed by choice of universal machine

### 4.3 What CRR Adds

1. **Decision rule:** Switch when  $\mathcal{S}_m - \mathcal{S}_{m'} > \Delta_{m,m'}$
2. **Computable proxy:** Temporal surprisal accumulation approximates algorithmic complexity
3. **Regeneration mechanism:**  $R[\phi] = Z^{-1} \int \phi \cdot \exp(-\mathcal{S}/\Omega) d\tau$
4. **Two tunable parameters:**
  - $\Delta_{m,m'}$ : Switching threshold (model-dependent)
  - $\Omega$ : Selection temperature (global)

## 5 Compatibility Analysis

**Theorem 5.1** (Compatibility). *CRR and Solomonoff induction are mathematically compatible. CRR operationalizes aspects of Solomonoff for finite agents:*

<i>Solomonoff</i>	<i>CRR</i>
$K(y h)$ (data complexity)	$\mathcal{S}_h(n)$ (accumulated surprisal)
$K(m') - K(m)$ (model complexity diff)	$\Delta_{m,m'}$ (switching threshold)
Likelihood weighting $2^{-K(y h)}$	Regeneration $\exp(-\mathcal{S}/\Omega)$
Continuous mixture	Discrete rupture at threshold

**Remark 5.2** (What CRR Does Not Capture). CRR regeneration captures evidence weighting but not the Solomonoff prior  $2^{-K(h)}$  directly. The prior enters CRR through:

- The model set  $\mathcal{M}$  (which models are considered)
- The prior  $p(m)$  (implicit in  $\Delta_{m,m'} = \log(p(m)/p(m'))$  interpretation)

**Remark 5.3** (One-Sentence Summary). CRR describes how bounded agents can approximate Bayesian evidence weighting through temporal dynamics and threshold-triggered model switching, using surprisal accumulation as a computable proxy for algorithmic complexity.

## 6 Comparison Tables

Table 1: Parameter Roles

Parameter	Role	Solomonoff Analogue
$\Delta_{m,m'}$	Switching threshold; when to change models	$K(m') - K(m)$ (complexity overhead)
$\Omega$	Temperature; how sharply to weight by fit	$1/\ln 2$ for exact correspondence

Table 2: What Each Framework Provides

Feature	Solomonoff	CRR
Prior over hypotheses $2^{-K(h)}$	Yes	Indirect (via $p(m)$ )
Likelihood weighting $2^{-K(y h)}$	Yes	Yes ( $\exp(-\mathcal{S}/\Omega)$ )
Optimal prediction guarantee	Yes	No
Decision rule (when to switch)	No	Yes ( $\mathcal{S}_m - \mathcal{S}_{m'} > \Delta$ )
Computable	No	Yes (for finite $\mathcal{M}$ )
Tunable parameters	No	Yes ( $\Delta, \Omega$ )

## 7 Limitations and Open Questions

### 7.1 Limitations of CRR

1. **No universal prior:** CRR regeneration captures evidence weighting but not the Solomonoff prior directly
2. **Model class restriction:** Requires specifying  $\mathcal{M}$  in advance
3. **Parameter dependence:** Results depend on  $\Delta$  and  $\Omega$ , which must be determined
4. **No convergence guarantee:** Unlike Solomonoff, no proof that CRR converges to truth

### 7.2 Limitations of Solomonoff

1. **Incomputable:** Cannot be implemented
2. **No decision rule:** Provides probabilities but not when to act
3. **No temporal structure:** Does not address discrete change

### 7.3 Open Questions

1. Can CRR be extended to include a proper Solomonoff-like prior term?
2. Is there a principled derivation of  $\Omega$  (independent of Solomonoff matching)?
3. How should  $\Delta_{m,m'}$  be set in practice?
4. Does CRR with appropriate parameters converge to Solomonoff as  $|\mathcal{M}| \rightarrow \infty$ ?

## 8 Conclusion

This analysis establishes:

1. **Partial correspondence:** CRR surprisal corresponds to  $K(y|h)$ ; regeneration implements likelihood/evidence weighting  $2^{-K(y|h)}$ , not the full Solomonoff posterior
2. **Parameter separation:** The switching threshold  $\Delta$  and temperature  $\Omega$  serve distinct roles and should not be conflated
3. **Sign consistency:** Regeneration must use  $\exp(-\mathcal{S}/\Omega)$  (negative exponent) for mathematical consistency
4. **Complementarity:** Solomonoff specifies *what* is optimal; CRR specifies *when* to switch and *how* to weight evidence

The relationship: *CRR implements the evidence-weighting component of Bayesian inference with explicit decision rules, using surprisal accumulation as a computable proxy for algorithmic complexity.*

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## A Technical Notes

### A.1 Levin's Coding Theorem

**Theorem A.1** (Levin). *For any computable probability distribution  $P$  and string  $x$ :*

$$-\log P(x) = K(x) + O(K(P)) \tag{31}$$

### A.2 Chain Rule for Kolmogorov Complexity

**Theorem A.2** (Chain Rule).

$$K(x, y) = K(x) + K(y|x^*) + O(\log K(x, y)) \tag{32}$$

where  $x^*$  is the shortest program for  $x$ .

### A.3 Why the Negative Sign Matters

In the original CRR formulation, if coherence  $C$  is defined as accumulated prediction error (a cost), then weighting by  $\exp(+C/\Omega)$  would favor *worse*-fitting states.

The correct form is either:

- Define  $C$  as negative surprisal (higher = better fit), weight by  $\exp(+C/\Omega)$
- Define  $\mathcal{S}$  as surprisal/cost (higher = worse fit), weight by  $\exp(-\mathcal{S}/\Omega)$

This document uses the second convention for clarity.